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Abstract
While previous research has emphasized the role of stakeholder pressures, firm-spe-
cific factors, as well as CEO characteristics as important drivers of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) implementation, our understanding of how political connections
impact small and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs') CSR implementation expenditure
is quite limited. In this study, we contribute to filling this gap by investigating the
effects of political connections and CSR expenditure and explain the conditions that
impact this relationship. Using data from 473 SMEs in Ghana, we find that political
connections negatively influence CSR implementation expenditure. However, the
negative effect is weakened when a firms' reputation and competitive CSR imple-
mentation pressures are high. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
As corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues continue to dominate
the academic literature and the popular business press, policymakers
are taking steps to rain in on firms' social performance. Indeed, busi-
ness organizations now consider their social performance as part of
the overall business strategy. Accordingly, firms are using their strong
CSR performance as a marketing tool to enhance social legitimacy and
reputation (Brammer & Millington, 2008; Julian & Ofori-
Dankwa, 2013). One important research stream within this perspec-
tive, undertaken primarily in transition economies, has explored the
relationship between political connections and CSR activities (Huang
& Zhao, 2016; Lin, Tan, Zhao, & Karim, 2015; Luo, 2006). These stud-
ies have used the social capital theory (Adler & Kwon, 2002;
Bourdieu, 1986) to explain that, firms increase their CSR activities
when they are politically connected. However, the existing literature
is inconclusive concerning how political connections predict increases
in firms' CSR expenditure.
Whiles the existing literature has focused on the large multina-
tional corporations when it comes to discussion on CSR issues, recent
debates are turning attention to small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) in institutionally uncertain environments (e.g., Luken &
Stares, 2005; Lund-Thomsen, Lindgreen, & Vanhamme, 2016; Sethi,
Shah, & Jan, 2018). Consequently, scholars have started to pay atten-
tion to CSR issues in institutionally challenging environments, such as
sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 2013; Matten &
Moon, 2008). For example, Julian and Ofori-Dankwa (2013) found
that financial resource availability negatively impacts on CSR activities
in Ghana, suggesting that the previous conclusion of most studies
examining this relationship is inconclusive (Orlitzky, Schmidt, &
Rynes, 2003). Thus, the drivers of CSR implementation may differ
depending on contextual factors (Campbell, 2007; Matten &
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Moon, 2008) as different institutional environments influence norms
and practices of CSR activities (Gjølberg, 2009).
Whiles previous studies have established that political connec-
tions positively influence firms' CSR performance (see Huang &
Zhao, 2016; Luo, 2006; Zhang, 2017), we argue that politically con-
nected firms situated in institutionally challenging environments may
not positively increase their CSR activities. We argue that the univer-
sally agreed position regarding a positive effect of political connec-
tions on CSR performance may be premature as institutional
environments in most developing countries are characterized by arbi-
trary enforcement of the law, bureaucratic inconsistency, insecurity of
property rights. Given this situation, CSR may get a very different
twist in these countries (Dobers & Halme, 2009; Kuznetsov,
Kuznetsova, & Warren, 2009; Zou, Xie, Meng, & Yang, 2019). Besides,
scholarly effort to delineate the boundary conditions of the relation-
ship between political connections and CSR spending is lacking. This
paucity of research is surprising given that many studies have
highlighted the influence of political connections on firm behavior (Li
& Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Zhang, 2017; Zhou, 2013). We test corpo-
rate reputation and CSR implementation pressure as potential bound-
ary conditions of this relationship. As firms develop a reputation over
time, they are likely to ensure the quality of CSR activities that they
directly or indirectly pursue. This is likely to facilitate the promotion
of firms' products and services. Related to CSR implementation pres-
sure, firms tend to enhance their legitimacy by imitating successful
competitors (Campbell, 2006). Therefore, these factors could pressure
firms to pursue CSR activities to exploit new opportunities and create
a competitive advantage in the marketplace to obtain superior
performance.
This study contributes to the literature in three main ways. First,
our study contributes to the social capital literature by showing how
politically connected SMEs in a developing country pursue CSR activi-
ties. Specifically, we integrate the impact of social capital developed
from social networking relationships and ties with government offi-
cials to explain a firm's CSR expenditure. This is an important exten-
sion of the literature given that previous studies (e.g., Dobers &
Halme, 2009; Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 2013; Lin et al., 2015) have
overlooked this line of thought in developing countries. Second,
examining CSR in a resource-poor context enables us to provide a
nuanced understanding of impending factors of CSR spending. Third,
by testing the role of corporate reputation and competitive CSR
implementation pressure on the political connections-CSR expendi-
ture relationship, we show the conditions under which social capital
developed from the social networking relationships and ties with gov-
ernment officials effectively drive CSR expenditure in a resource-con-
strained environment. In doing so, we add to the debate on whether
and, if so, how political connections promote or inhibit CSR expendi-
ture within an institutional setting, namely, Ghana. This context
enables us to provide a channel through which political networking
affects CSR expenditure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we present
the theoretical framework and derive the hypotheses. Next, we
describe the sample and data collection procedure. We then present
the analyses and results of the study. We conclude the study with the
discussion of findings as well as the theoretical and practical implica-
tions of the study.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
HYPOTHESES
2.1 | Social capital theory
Political network and ties are not uncommon in sub-Saharan Africa
due to the collectivistic nature of cultures found in this region
(Acquaah, 2007). Scholarly studies in organizational theory and indus-
trial sociology tend to direct our attention to the role of managerial
networking and interpersonal relationships in facilitating the exchange
of valuable information, resources, and knowledge among entrepre-
neurs (e.g., Adler & Kwon, 2002; Laumann, Galaskiewicz, & Mar-
sden, 1978). Our study draws on social capital theory
(Bourdieu, 1986; Granovetter, 1985) to offer a better understanding
of the effects of political networking arguing that political connections
are important informal governance mechanisms that lessen the effect
of institutional voids (Acquaah, 2007). Previous research shows that
network ties are a crucial form of a managerial tool when legal and
regulatory institutions are weak in enforcing economic exchanges
(Granovetter, 2005; Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011). This study contends
that because formal entrepreneurial-supporting institutions in emerg-
ing country settings are less effective (London & Hart, 2004), political
connections (defined as entrepreneurs' social ties and connections
with regulatory and governmental institutions) may be crucial for
explaining CSR expenditure in a developing country setting.
While the value of inter-organizational networking activities may
be less important in industrialized societies, they are critical in
explaining variations in firm activities and performance creation in
transition and developing economies (Guo, Xu, & Jacobs, 2014; Sheng
Political Connections 
Firm reputation













F IGURE 1 The conceptual model of the study [Colour figure can
be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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et al., 2011). Therefore, integrating insights from organizational social
capital theories and CSR, we examine the relationship between politi-
cal connections and CSR expenditure under differential levels of firm
reputation and competitive CSR implementation. Our conceptual
model is presented in Figure 1.
2.2 | Political connections and CSR expenditure
Based on social capital theory, we posit that the effect of political
connections on CSR performance is negative. The social exchange
theory suggests that the relationships firms develop with political
authorities (including ties with governmental officials and public
officeholders) have the potential to determine the competitive advan-
tage of firms (Getz, 1997; Hillman & Hitt, 1999). While some scholars
have argued that many firms remain politically disengaged and tend to
pursue an arms-length relationship with political leaders to avoid the
accusation of political patronage (e.g., Baron, 1995; Yoffie, 1987),
recent observations indicate that political actions of corporate entities
are globally pervasive because of the obvious benefits it provides
firms: (a) it enables firms to influence public policy and regulations
(Oliver & Holzinger, 2008); and (b) it is a channel through which firms
immerse themselves in their target markets as it signals a firm's legiti-
macy (Welsh & Young, 2011).
Accordingly, we argue that a firm's increased nonmarket activities
can be leveraged to achieve strategic objectives (Schuler, Rehbein, &
Cramer, 2002). Because public policy decisions have great potential to
influence firms' current and future strategic directions, firms view
their efforts to influence the political process as a matter of exercising
their fundamental right to protect their shareholders' investments
(Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). Based on the assumption that firms
leverage opportunities and challenges in the nonmarket environment
to their economic advantage (Baron, 1995) and given the potential
opportunities associated with such nonmarket strategies with
respects to expenditure on the sustainability courses (Julian & Ofori-
Dankwa, 2013), we assert that the impact of political connections on
firms' CSR expenditure is negative. There are several reasons why we
expect the relationship to be negative. First, we reason that firms may
rely on their relationships with political leaders to build and protect
the value of their investments, such that not adhering to CSR con-
cerns of the population may become less damaging to the firm when
the firms are well connected in public policymaking corridors. For
example, a firm can legally obtain exemptions from regulatory restric-
tions on employee rights and environmental emissions by lobbying
political and public officeholders to enact policies that favor the firm's
actions. In this direction, the political strategy management literature
indicates that political networking is a viable option for firms to influ-
ence regulations, and even change the way the general public per-
ceive CSR issues (Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Bierman, 1999). In other
words, when firms are well connected to political and public policy
officeholders, they can still enjoy a superior competitive advantage by
spending less of their retained profits on social activities. Thus, we
argue that:
Hypothesis H1 For firms operating in a developing economy, political
connections will negatively relate to CSR expenditure.
2.3 | Moderating role of firm reputation
An important aim of the present study was to explain the conditions
under which social capital derived from government officials may be
effective in driving a firm's CSR expenditure. Evidence shows that
firms are getting ahead of competition and can substantially influence
local, national, and international environmental regulations by hiring
former politicians and diplomats to lobby policymakers to enact legis-
lation that is supportive of firms' strategic goals (Lipton &
Hakim, 2013). In China, knowing someone close to political leadership
is seen as a major strategic asset for firms seeking favorable treatment
from Chinese industry regulators (Sheng et al., 2011). This suggests
that firms may be able to influence policies related to CSR and envi-
ronmental practices and thereby refuse to abide by these regulations
when they forge strainer ties with politicians. However, we suggest
that because firms with a good reputation tend to prevent issues that
will erode their good standing in society, they are likely to abide by
the rules related to CSR and environmental practices. Accordingly, we
introduce a firm reputation as a moderating variable of the relation-
ship between political connections and CSR spending.
A firm's reputation reflects the overall estimation of how the firm
is held by its stakeholders based on its past actions to determine how
the firm is likely to behave in the future (Walsh & Beatty, 2007). Argu-
ably, a firm can show its concern about the environment by using an
environmentally friendly strategy such as product offerings, equal
opportunity employment, philanthropy, and other similar endeavors
(Nguyen, Wu, Evangelista, & Nguyen, 2020). By employing such a
strategy, the firm's reputation can be boosted as well as generating
reciprocal goodwill in the long run (Brammer & Millington, 2005;
Nguyen et al., 2020).
In this, we argue that the negative influence of political connec-
tions on CSR expenditure will be attenuated when the firm's reputa-
tion is greater. First, given that a good reputation influences positive
responses from customers, firms will continue to boost their reputa-
tion through environmentally friendly product offerings, equal-oppor-
tunity employment, contributions to charitable causes, and other
similar endeavors. This is because customers tend to measure the
underlying quality and value of the firm's product offerings (Hansen,
Samuelsen, & Silseth, 2008). Second, a good reputation tends to
attract customers as most of these customers value their association
with the reputation of the firm (Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Third, a
good corporate reputation is likely to attract superior human
resources which in turn could enhance the firm's competitive advan-
tage (Wright, Ferris, Hiller, & Kroll, 1995). Given that firms with a
good reputation are highly interested to attract candidates with skills,
they are likely to reduce the political activities to main their reputa-
tion. Thus, a good reputation elicits good behavior by responding to
stakeholders' demands including customers, employees, and suppliers.
The notion here is that firms with a good reputation cannot afford to
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ignore their primary responsibility toward CSR. Therefore, we pro-
pose that:
Hypothesis H2 For firms operating in a developing economy, the
negative effect of political connections on CSR expenditure will
become weaker when the firm's reputation is greater.
2.4 | Moderating role of competitive CSR
implementation pressure
The tendency for competitors to vie for resources is a major character-
istic of market economies (Schwartz & Carroll, 2008). This competition
results in pressures for firms to offer innovative products and services.
Competitive CSR implementation pressures are defined as the pres-
sures emanating from competitors to embark on CSR activities (Helmig,
Spraul, & Ingenhoff, 2016). We argue that since political connections
tend to attenuate CSR implementation spending, pressures from com-
petitors will stimulate firms to implement CSR activities. Given the
pressures from competitors, it could be the case that CSR would
change from a social or stakeholder obligation to a business obligation,
which alters the entire competitive environment (Kowalczyk &
Kucharska, 2020). In this regard, firms are likely to reduce their political
networking activities and increase their effort to boost their CSR stand-
ing to stay competitive (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2007). Besides, when
CSR implementation represents a competitive advantage, firms are
likely to receive direct pressures to implement CSR activities (Dupire
and M'Zali, 2018; Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult, 1999). This notion has been
established in the CSR literature arguing that industry pressures for
environmental responsibility can also result from competitors' actions
(Boiral, Heras-Saizarbitoria, & Testa, 2017; Christmann, 2004, p. 749).
A major rationale is that firms tend to imitate their successful competi-
tors to gain legitimacy. Thus, we argue that:
Hypothesis H3 For firms operating in a developing economy, the
negative effect of political connections on CSR expenditure will
become weaker when competitive CSR implementation pres-
sure is greater.
3 | RESEARCH METHOD
3.1 | Study setting: Ghana
The choice of Ghana as the study's setting was informed by two rea-
sons. First, Ghana, in some respects, is considered a representative of
sub-Saharan African emerging economies that also shares the chal-
lenges of doing business in less developed societies (Hoskisson, Eden,
& Wright, 2000; Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 2013). Second, Ghana is
characterized by high information asymmetry due to institutional and
infrastructural underdevelopment (Abor & Biekpe, 2006), resulting in
a requirement for firms to go beyond formal codes of business trans-
action to incorporate informal interpersonal relations to be successful
(Peng & Luo, 2000). Hence, Ghana is a useful case to study firm
behavior in a more challenging circumstance.
3.2 | Sample and data
The sampling frame for this study was developed from Ghana's com-
pany register database (Acquaah, 2007). We selected a sample of
1,000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from this register.
The sample met the following: (a) firms with complete contact infor-
mation on the CEO, (b) firms that are manufacturers of physical prod-
ucts or service providers that engage in productive business activities
(c) firms employing a maximum of 250 employees to SMEs (Ghana
Statistical Service, 2000). To obtain a high response rate, we promised
the CEOs that information about respondents and companies would
be kept in strictest confidence. The respondents were also promised a
summary of the research findings.
Data were collected in two waves. In the first wave, the CEOs of
the 1,000 SMEs were contacted with a questionnaire delivered in-
person to collect data on political connections, firm reputation, CSR
implementation pressure, and the control variables. Out of the 1,000
questionnaires, we received 493 responses and 9 questionnaires were
discarded due to missing values. Thus, 484 complete responses; rep-
resenting 48.40% were valid in the first phase.
Next, in wave 2, we contacted finance managers/chief accoun-
tants of the 484 SMEs using the door-to-door approach to collect
data on CSR implementation expenditure. We found that 11 of the
firms had no finance managers or the CEO was also the finance man-
agers. Thus, we relied on 473 matched responses (47.30%) for the
analysis.
The average number of full-time employees was 15 and the aver-
age annual turnover was US$841,129. The average age of the firms
was 7 years. The participating firms represented two industries:
manufacturing (65%) and service (35%). To assess nonresponse bias,
early and late respondents were compared in terms of firm age, firm
size, CEO tenure, and education. The results show no significant dif-
ference in the study constructs. This suggests that nonresponse bias
does not significantly affect the data (Armstrong & Overton, 1977).
3.3 | Measures
All the construct measures were derived construct measures from
previous studies and measured on 7-point scale. Table 1 presents spe-
cific items used and their respective factor loadings and t-values.
Political connections. We measured political connections using a
four-item scale from Acquaah (2007). This scale measures network
relationships with government officials and politicians. We asked the
CEOs to indicate how extensive (or how little) their ties were to dif-
ferent types and levels of bureaucratic and government officials.
Firm reputation. We used six items from previous studies to cap-
ture firm reputation (Fombrun et al., 2000; Rettab et al., 2009). This
scale has been recently found to be robust (Nguyen et al., 2020).
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Competitive CSR implementation pressure. We adopted five items
from Helmig et al. (2016) to measure competitive CSR implementation
pressure on a Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree and
7 = strongly agree.
CSR implementation expenditure. This construct was measured as
the expenditure of the firm's spending on CSR activities as a percent-
age of sales, return on investment, and profit; thus, providing a more
reliable measure of the actual extent of the commitment of companies
with CSR activities (Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 2013). Overall, we used
three items to capture CSR expenditure. Finance managers/chief
accountants were asked to state the percentage of return on invest-
ment, return on sales, and profit margin spent on CSR activities.
Control variables. We controlled several variables as these have
been found to influence CSR activities of firms. These variables are
TABLE 1 Constructs, reliability, and validity assessment
Constructs and measurement Loading (t-values) Cronbach's α CR AVE
Political connections (Acquaah, 2007) 0.92 0.94 0.74
Top managers at our firm have maintained good personal relationships with officials in
various levels of government
0.76 (1.00)
So far, our firm's relationship with regional government officials has been in good
shape
0.79 (12.18)
Top managers at our firm have developed good connections with officials in
regulatory and supporting organizations such as tax bureaus, state banks, and
commercial administration bureaus
0.89 (14.22)
Top managers at our firm have maintained good relationships with officials in
industrial and investment institutions (e.g., investment board, export promotion
council, Ghana stock exchange)
0.90 (23.51)
Firm reputation ( Fombrun, Gardberg, & Sever, 2000; Rettab, Brik, & Mellahi, 2009) 0.95 0.96 0.76
In general, our firm has a good reputation 0.81 (1.00)
We are widely acknowledged as a trustworthy organization 0.90 (22.52)
This firm has a reputation for selling high-quality products and services .93 (25.19)
Our firm has a reputation for complying with all laws on the hiring of employees and
the administration of benefits
0.77 (10.89)
Our salespersons and employees have the reputation of providing full and accurate
information to all customers
0.89 (15.75)
Our firm is known for giving active support to programs working in good social causes 0.88 (15.06)
Competitive CSR implementation pressure (Helmig et al., 2016) 0.83 0.85 0.63
Competitive corporate social responsibility (CSR) implementation pressure 0.85 (1.00)
Our strongest competitors take a leading role in CSR 0.88 (19.67)
Our strongest competitors are known for their transparent communication policies. .75 (10.18)
Our strongest competitors communicate openly about their corporate social
responsibility activities
0.80 (19.68)
Our strongest competitors invest regularly in social funds and projects 0.90 (22.73)
Financial resource slack (Atuahene-Gima, Slater, & Olson, 2005) 0.79 0.80 0.57
This business has uncommitted financial resources that can quickly be used to fund
new strategic initiatives
0.83 (1.00)
This business has few financial resources available in the short run to fund its
initiatives
0.88 (20.60)
We can obtain financial resources at short notice to support new strategic initiatives. 0.84 (19.93)
We have substantial financial resources at the discretion of management for funding
strategic initiatives
0.76 (10.11)
CSR expenditure (Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 2013) 0.90 0.92 0.70
% of return on investment spent on health concerns, such as children's health,
malnutrition, and medical research
0.85 (1.00)
% of annual profit spent on education, such as the provision of scholarships 0.90 (24.14)
% of return on sales spent issues relating to the socially vulnerable, such as women,
children, and the physically challenged
0.77 (11.19)
Abbreviations: AVE, average variance extracted; CR, composite reliability.
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firm age, firm size, financial resource slack, industry, CEO tenure, and
education. Firm size was measured with the number of full-time
employees, and firm age was captured as the number of years the
business has operated since its first sales. Financial resource slack was
captured by four items following Atuahene-Gima et al. (2005). The
industry was measured with a dummy variable with “0” indicating the
manufacturing industry and “1” indicating otherwise. CEO tenure was
captured by using the years in which the CEO has been employed in
his/her current position (see Boling, Pieper, & Covin, 2016). We con-
trolled founder/CEO education (“1” = “high school,” “2” = “Higher
national diploma,” “3” = “bachelor's degree,” “4” = “master's degree,”
and “5” = “doctoral degree”).
3.4 | Common method bias, validity, and reliability
To assess common method variance in the data, we followed Cote
and Buckley (1987) and assumed a conservative single-method bias
using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test three alternative hier-
archically nested measurement models. Accordingly, we estimated
three competing models. In Model 1, we estimated the method-only
model in which all indicators loaded on a single latent factor. Next,
Model 2 estimated a trait-only model where each indicator loaded on
its respective latent factor. Finally, Model 3 was a method and trait
model involving the inclusion of a common factor linking all the indica-
tors in Model 2. When the three models were compared, we found
that Model 2 and Model 3 are better than Model 1 and that Model 3
is not substantially superior to Model 2. Table 2 presents the common
method bias nested models. Collectively, we assumed that the vari-
ance in responses can be explained by the simultaneous effect of
traits, method, and random error. Thus, common method bias does
not sufficiently describe the data.
Next, we established the validity and reliability of all the multi-
item constructs. Accordingly, we tested the measurement model in
CFA using LISREL 8.71 with the maximum likelihood estimation pro-
cedure. All the items loaded significantly on the expected constructs,
indicating convergent validity and discriminant validity of the mea-
sures (Montoya-Weiss, Massey, & Song, 2001). Table 1 displays spe-
cific items used to measure the constructs and their respective factor
loadings and t-values. All values for composite reliabilities (CR) were
significantly larger than 0.60, the level considered as evidence for con-
vergent validity (Bagozzi & Yi, 2012). Besides, we received Cronbach's
α values that were higher than the suggested cut-off value .70 for all
constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Overall, the fit indexes showed
that the model fit the data reasonably well. The fit indices were ade-
quate: χ2/df = 1.33, RMSEA = 0.06; NNFI = 0.96; CFI = 0.96. Besides,
all the constructs had accepted levels of reliability, average variance
extracted (AVE), and discriminant validity (Table 1).
TABLE 2 Common Method Bias Nested Models
Model χ2 df χ2/df RMSEA CFI NNFI
M1: Method 4,108.85*** 1922 2.13 0.15 0.22 0.28
M2: Trait 1,527.41*** 978 1.56 0.05 0.95 0.97
M3: Trait-method 1,207.29*** 963 1.25 0.06 0.97 0.97
Abbreviations: CFI, comparative fit index; df, degrees of freedom; NNFI, non-normed fit index; RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation.
***p < .001.
TABLE 3 Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 473)
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Firm size (employees)
Firm age (years) −0.05
Financial resource slack 0.11 0.07
Industry type −0.04 −0.05 −0.05
CEO tenure 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.01
Education 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03
Competitive CSR implementation pressure −0.10 −0.11 0.20** 0.10 −0.09 0.12
Firm reputation 0.11 0.10 0.14* 0.13* 0.08 0.16* 0.26**
Political connections 0.18** 0.14* 0.33** −0.01 0.15* 0.13* −0.39** 0.34**
CSR expenditure 0.23** 0.04 0.23** 0.14* −0.09 0.14* 0.19** 0.36** −0.31**
Mean 14.65 7.35 3.22 0.60 2.88 0.27 5.04 4.99 5.72 4.29%
SD 26.90 5.47 0.73 0.49 0.78 0.44 0.68 0.57 1.02 3.16%
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
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4 | RESULTS
Table 3 presents the correlations and descriptive statistics. Hierarchi-
cal regression was used to test the hypotheses (Cohen &
Cohen, 1983). To attenuate the treat of multicollinearity, the indepen-
dent and moderating variables were mean-centered before the inter-
action terms were created (Aiken & West, 1991). The largest variance
inflation factors (VIF) was 2.11, which is lower than the critical value
of 10, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern in the data
(Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996).
Table 4 contains the results of the regression models. Model 1
contains the results of the control variables. Model 2 added the direct
effects variables. Hypothesis 1 proposed that, political connections
will negatively relate to CSR expenditure. We find support for this
hypothesis as the coefficient of CSR expenditure is negative and sig-
nificant (β = −0.18, p < 0.01).
Hypothesis 2 states that the negative influence on political con-
nections on CSR expenditure is weaker when the firm's reputation is
greater. The finding in Model 3 shows that the interaction term for
political connections and firm reputation is positive and significant
(β = −0.37, p < 0.01). To gain further insights into the direction of the
moderation impact, we followed the guidelines advanced by (Dawson
& Richter, 2006) and created an interaction plot using mean-centered
values. The graph of this interaction (Figure 2) shows that the nega-
tive relationship between political connections and CSR expenditure
is weaker when the firm's reputation is high but not when it is low.
Thus, we received support for 2.
Hypothesis 3 proposes that the negative effect of political con-
nections on CSR expenditure is weaker when competitive CSR
TABLE 4 Findings of regression analyses (dependent variable: CSR expenditure) (N = 473)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Control variables
Firm age (years) 0.14** 0.14** 0.13** 0.14** 0.14**
Firm size (employees) 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04
Financial resource slack 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.17***
Industry type 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05
CEO tenure −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 −0.05 −0.04
Education 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05
Direct effect variables
H1: Political connections (PC) −0.18*** −0.18*** −0.20*** −0.19***
Firm reputation 0.09* 0.10* 0.11* 0.10*
Competitive CSR implementation pressure 0.11* 0.12* 0.12* 0.11*
Two-way interaction effects
H2: Political connections × firm reputation −0.37*** −0.37***
H3: Political connections × competitive CSR implementation pressure −0.34** −0.33**
Firm reputation × competitive CSR implementation pressure 0.20*** 0.21***
Three-way interaction effect
PC × firm reputation × competitive CSR implementation pressure −0.53*** −0.53***
Model fit
F-value 1.98 3.98*** 4.88*** 7.96*** 7.99***
R2 0.14 0.17 0.22 0.30 0.31
ΔR2 - 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.01
Largest VIF 1.65 1.66 1.92 2.09 2.11
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F IGURE 2 Interaction effect of political connections with a firm
reputation on corporate social responsibility (CSR) expenditure
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implementation pressure is high. The result in Model 3 indicates that
the interaction of political connections with competitive CSR imple-
mentation pressure prevention focus is significant and negative for
CSR expenditure (β = −0.34, p < 0.01). The graph of this interaction
(Figure 3) demonstrates that the relationship between political con-
nections and CSR expenditure is weaker when competitive CSR
implementation pressure is high but not when it is low. Therefore, the
result in Model 3 supports Hypothesis 3.
4.1 | Robustness tests
We substantial the robustness of the findings, we performed addi-
tional analyses. First, we tested a three-way interaction between
political connections, firm reputation, and competitive CSR implemen-
tation pressure in Model. As shown in Model 4, this interaction is sig-
nificant and negative (β = −0.53; p < 0.01). Furthermore, as shown in
Figure 4, the negative relationship between political connections and
CSR expenditure is weaker when both firm reputation and competi-
tive CSR implementation pressure are high. Data points for plotting
Figures 2, 3, and 4 were computed using +/− 1SD for political connec-
tions, firm reputation, and competitive CSR implementation pressure.
Second, we extended our analysis beyond the usually examined mean
centering where variance inflation factor (VIF) values are used as
proxies for detecting multicollinearity by including all the interaction
terms concurrently (Model 5) in the regression equation. The results
are in the direction of hypothesized specifications. Prior research sug-
gests that when interaction terms with common variables are concur-
rently included in a model, they can conceal the detection of the true
moderating variables as a result of multicollinearity (e.g., De Clercq,
Dimov, & Belausteguigoitia, 2016). However, the interaction terms in
the main model and interaction term models show consistency. This
provides support for the robustness of our regression models (Covin,
Green, & Slevin, 2006).
5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Using insights from the social capital theory (Adler & Kwon, 2002;
Bourdieu, 1986), we examined the influence of political connections
on CSR expenditure of SMEs operating in a developing country-
Ghana. Besides, we tested the conditions under which political con-
nections may effectively influence SMEs' CSR implementation expen-
diture. In particular, the first finding (political connections negatively
relate to CSR expenditure) indicates the role of firms' political ties in
CSR activities in a developing country. The second finding of this
study (i.e., firm reputation moderates the relationship between politi-
cal connections and CSR expenditure) shows the importance of the
prior neglected role of firm reputation in explaining when political
connections could be beneficial for a firm's CSR activities. By integrat-
ing insights from the social capital theory and corporate reputation lit-
erature (Janney & Gove, 2011; Roberts & Dowling, 2002), this study
argues that corporate reputation is a valuable resource for converting
political networking relationships into greater CSR spending in a
developing country. Third, the role of competitive CSR pressure is
hypothesized and tested in Hypothesis 2 as a moderator of the rela-
tionship between political connections and CSR expenditure. Given
that competitors tend to vie for resources, the resultant effect puts
pressure firms to innovate to enhance their product outlook in the
market (Helmig et al., 2016). Therefore, given the CSR activities in the
firm's competitive environment, it may be the case that firms with
stronger political connections would pursue CSR activities when com-
petitive pressure to implement CSR is greater especially if
implementing CSR represents a competitive advantage (Du
et al., 2007). Put together, these findings have several critical contri-
butions for both theory and practice.
First, our findings extend our understanding of the role of political
connections in impeding CSR expenditure in developing country con-
texts. The political ties literature has conventionally argued that when
firms cultivate stronger relationships with government officials and
bureaucrats, it enables access to resources for firms (Acquaah, 2007)
and this translates into greater CSR spending (Huang & Zhao, 2016;
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cultivate greater relationships with political authorities, firms' expendi-
ture on CSR activities reduces significantly. This is because firms that
maintain high levels of institutional ties (e.g., connection to politicians,
judges, governmental officials, country-level resource allocators) tend
to be counterproductive as it has the potential to lead to the accusa-
tion of nepotism, corruption, and favoritism, which may also nega-
tively impact on CSR activities. We provide a more nuanced
understanding of how political ties influence firms' CSR activities in
institutionally precarious environments such as those in developing
countries. Thus, we add to the “Institution Difference Hypothesis”
(IDH) (Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 2013), suggesting that the effects of
political connections on CSR expenditure are different depending on
contextual conditions.
Second, given that our sample comes from SMEs, our results con-
tribute to the political networking literature by demonstrating that for-
ming closer political ties with politicians, judges, and governmental
officials impedes SMEs' CSR implementation spending. Political connec-
tions have been traditionally investigated in the contexts of large listed
multinationals (Luo, 2006; Zhang, 2017). Extant knowledge of the roles
of political connections in SMEs operating a developing country is very
limited. Our study suggests that political connections are counterproduc-
tive in driving SMEs' CSR expenditure in developing countries.
Third, we advance scholarly understanding of the boundary con-
ditions of the effects of political connections. Specifically, we test two
conditions (firm reputation and competitive CSR implementation pres-
sure) under which the negative effect of political connections on CSR
spending is attenuated. To the best of our knowledge, our study is
among the first to test empirically the moderating role of these two
conditions. Particularly, the findings in Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3
suggest that firm reputation and competitive CSR implementation
pressure weaken the negative effect of political connections.
Beyond the theoretical contributions, our study has some practi-
cal and policy implications. First, the findings can guide developing
country managers to improve their firms' CSR implementation spend-
ing. In particular, the finding that political connections impede CSR
spending can help SME managers to moderate excessive political ties
in developing countries. Second, findings from our study have implica-
tions for understanding how firm reputation and CSR implementation
pressure attenuate the negative impact of political connections on
CSR implementation spending. This can guide companies to devise
effective CSR strategies in developing economies. Overall, the impor-
tance of the research topic and context suggests that this study can
extend our theoretical understanding and to guide managerial implica-
tions as well across other transforming economies.
6 | LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Our study has some limitations that open avenues for future research.
First, the cross-sectional nature of our sample precludes us from mak-
ing causal claims. Future research could use longitudinal data, col-
lected over time to help alleviate causality concerns. Second, this
study was conducted in the context of SMEs in Ghana. Consequently,
the generalizability of the study's findings is limited to and extrapolat-
ing the results reported here to other countries should be done with
caution. We encourage future researchers to examine our conceptual
model in a developed country where SMEs ae more resourceful
(Engelen, Kube, Schmidt, & Flatten, 2014). Third, beyond competitive
CSR implementation pressure and firm reputation examined in this
study, further research could consider other moderators of the politi-
cal connections CSR expenditure relationship. For example, future
studies could examine potential environmental and firm-level modera-
tors such as environmental dynamism and uncertainty. Fourth, future
research could address gender differences in political connections-
CSR expenditure in SMEs. Finally, future studies could also seek to
identify mediators of the effects of political connections on CSR. One
of these might be inter-organizational cooperation. Firms with high
networking relationships may corporate with other firms to undertake
CSR activities. The present research suggests several potentially valu-
able avenues for future studies, which must be tackled to advance
current knowledge on the subject.
In conclusion, we investigated the influence of political connec-
tions on CSR implementation expenditure. Besides, we examined two
conditions under which greater political connections translate in
greater CSR expenditure in SMEs. The findings from the study show
that the negative relationship between political connections and CSR
expenditure is attenuated when both firm reputation and competitive
CSR implementation pressure are greater. Our conceptual model,
which links political connections, firm reputation, competitive CSR
implementation pressure, and CSR expenditure, was empirically vali-
dated using data from 473 SMEs operating in Ghana. The findings
theoretically add to the CSR literature by clarifying when SMEs' non-
market strategies could help enhance CSR activities.
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